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The Reach of the Realm
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

In The Realm of Criminal Law, Antony Duff argues that the criminal law’s realm is bounded by territory.
This is because a polity decides what it cares about in crafting its civic home, and it extends its rules and
hospitality to guests (non-citizens). I question whether the most normatively attractive conception of a
Duffian polity would be bounded by territory, or whether it would exercise far more extensive jurisdiction
over its citizens wherever in the world they may be (active personality) and over harm to its
citizens/interests wherever in the world the attacks occur (passive personality).

How do we go about deciding upon the objects of criminalization? In the careful, nuanced, and
magisterial The Realm of Criminal Law, Antony Duff argues, “[W]e are, paradigmatically, criminally
responsible as citizens to our fellow citizens. The citizens of a polity are the primary addressees of its
criminal law: our criminal law speaks, paradigmatically, to us as citizens of a polity whose law it is (and
speaks in our collective voice); it is, paradigmatically, as citizens that we are bound by the criminal law; a
defendant in a criminal court appears, paradigmatically, as a citizen who must answer to his fellow
citizens.” (103)1 This polity determines its res publica, and through that determination, it determines
which wrongs are properly its concern.
Throughout the monograph, Duff’s foil is Michael Moore. To Moore, our starting point for
criminalization is moral wrongfulness.2 We may be limited by liberty and privacy, and we may not
enforce murder in other countries because of sovereignty, (75) but to Moore, moral wrongfulness writ
large is our business. (74-75)
Duff is troubled by this idea, as he finds a view that, even prima facie, maintains that the United
States could hold a Canadian citizen liable for defacing another Canadian citizen’s property in Canada to
be wildly counterintuitive:
Moore’s legal moralism ... is expansive as to its location and perpetrators, of the wrongs we
have reason to criminalize. If moral wrongdoing deserves punishment, it presumably deserves
1
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See generally Michael S. Moore, “A Tale of Two Theories,” Criminal Justice Ethics 28 (2009): 27-48.

punishment wherever, by whomever, against whomever it is committed. So we all have reason
to promise the imposition of such suffering on wrongdoers anywhere in the world, and thus
reason as legislators to bring all wrongdoers within the reach of the criminal law. Those reasons
are not restricted by geography or territory. The English legislature has reason to bring within
the scope of English criminal law not just wrongs committed within England, but those
committed anywhere in the world—to count as a crime under English law, triable in the English
courts and punishable in its penal system, murder, rape, theft committed anywhere in the
world, and indeed such wrongs as vandalizing property or drunken driving; to criminalize, and to
seek to punish criminal damage committed by a Turk on the streets of Istanbul. (74-75)

Instead, Duff endorses the “Territoriality Principle” (104): “what makes it the business of this
polity’s criminal law is that it committed within the polity’s territory—within its civic home.” (123)
Notably, a focus on territory still endorses the United States punishing a Canadian citizen who defaces
another Canadian citizen’s property if such defacing occurs in Kentucky.
But who should be calling the Canadian to account? Duff is quite ecumenical (or noncommittal)
about what a polity takes to be its business, but I want to explore whether a (potentially more)
normatively attractive account would rest on the jurisdictional bases known within international
criminal law as active or passive personality (crimes by or against citizens).3 That is, although Duff gets
much mileage out of his “civic home” analogy, I wonder whether the territorial boundaries we currently
observe are better explained and justified on sovereignty grounds than on the kind of civic relations that
Duff takes to be central. Shouldn’t Canada punish the Canadian who harms another Canadian wherever
in the world they may be? It is thus questionable whether the reach of the realm should be even
somewhat co-extensive with its territory. Thus, even using Duffian principles about how a polity should
think about its criminal law and the reach of its realm, one might wind up with a very different
conception. I will thus offer the contrast of a Ferzanian polity, one that abides by Duff’s first principles
and yet extends its reach far beyond the boundaries of its territory.
To be clear, what follows is not a devastating objection to Duff’s claims. Duff is going to allow
his polities to decide who they are and what matters to them in ways in which he may be able to simply
take on board that a Ferzanian polity might proceed in my direction. (Ferzanian polities are nosy. My
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husband is constantly telling me to mind my own business, but I think a lot of things are my business.)
Still, to the extent that Duff maintains the territorial boundaries of the criminal law provide intuitive
support for Duff’s vision over Moore’s, we must question whether Duff’s own view should truly abide by
the boundaries of nation-states. And, as the civic home loses its territorial boundedness, we might ask
how well Duff can accommodate non-citizens after all.
I.

Justifying the Reach and Limits of the Duffian Realm

To set the stage for our inquiry, it is important to see how Duff arrives at a polity whose laws are
bounded by territory. Duff’s interlocutors have attacked from two flanks. One set is the Moorean
universalists. Against them, Duff has argued that crimes within other countries aren’t our business. The
other set is the group that complains that an implication of Duff’s view is that non-citizens become some
strange lesser/other.4 To these objections, Duff has argued that we ought to treat non-citizens as guests
in our home, protected by, and held to, our rules. (122).
Let’s begin with the universalists. Duff agrees with Moore that there are moral wrongs. But he
disagrees with an approach that starts with moral wrongs and then looks for a limiting principle, such as
sovereignty or privacy concerns. Although Duff’s view of public wrongs seems to invite selecting the
wrongs that are public versus private, Duff says this is the wrong way round. Instead, one is supposed to
start with the polity, as it looks for those wrongs that are properly the object of its concern. (78)
To bolster his case that not all wrongs might be a polity’s business, he gives us the analogy of
doctors. When they come to think of their medical profession, they come up with a code that governs
their behavior, but that does not include all wrongs that doctors might commit. (80-83) Arson just isn’t
the medical profession’s business. A polity, then, asks which of the immoral behaviors are appropriately
the polity’s business such that it may call its citizens to account.
Duff thinks that his account is in line with the Territoriality Principle, that is, that “a state’s
courts have jurisdiction over all crimes committed within its territory.” (103) As Duff states in
“Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law,” Saddam Hussein should be tried in Iraq and Augusto
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Pinochet should be tried in Chile.5 As Duff explains, “The thought is that in each case that ‘we’ should
try ‘our’ wrongs, and their perpetrators.”6 Duff thinks that his account has explanatory superiority over
pragmatic accounts because his can explain nationality (or active personality) and passive personality
jurisdiction: “neither of these can be readily rationalized in terms of the efficient satisfaction of the
demands of impersonal and universal justice.”7 Duff claims that he can better account for these
principles, but he does not “recommend” such principles: “we could instead argue either that, although
we have some reason to extend the ambit and jurisdiction of our criminal law in one or both of these
ways, we should defer to the polity in which the crimes are committed, and leave the matter to their
criminal law; or that wrongs committed by, or to, our fellow citizens are properly our business only
when they are committed within our civic home.” (118) To Duff, this “we,” then, is bounded
geographically, because we are living together.8
But once we look to the home, and how we live together, an altogether different concern arises.
A code for citizens by citizens seems to neglect non-citizens. 9 How is it that they are required to abide
by our rules? And how is it that we don’t demean them by not including them within our political
community? Here, Duff gives us the “guest in our home” analogy. Our guests are bound, and
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As Duff acknowledges:
Within the territory of any modern polity there will be a large number of non-citizens: people
who are in the territory as, for instance, tourists, or short-term business visitors; or who entered
for a longer period as workers, or to join family members; or who made their lives and homes in
the polity, although they have not been granted, or perhaps have not sought, citizenship; or
who have entered as refugees, as asylum seekers, or as would-be immigrants (legally or nonlegally). (120)

protected, by our rules.10 The law will cover them because they commit offenses within its territory.
(121) The more difficult question for Duff is how an account grounded in citizenship can protect such
individuals. (121) Duff believes “we can talk seriously of duties of hospitality that we owe to guests.”
(122).
With these two analogies, doctors and guests, we have a neat and happy civic home. We care
mainly about how we treat each other in our home, extending our rules to guests. But maybe Duffians
should not care so much about homes. To be sure, we need territory to define our community and our
structure, but why should it define the reach of the criminal law? Perhaps territory limits the most
normatively attractive Duffian account just as it does the most normatively attractive Moorean account.
In both cases, territory is a concession to sovereignty.
II.

An Alternative Conception: Ferzania

Let us consider the hypothetical polity of Ferzania. In true Duffian fashion, the polity of Ferzania
has been doing quite a bit of deliberating about the moral wrongs that are its business. It begins with
typical crimes such as rape, murder, and arson. But it conceptualizes its jurisdictional reach quite
differently than Duff would have it. First, it thinks that its citizens ought to be called to account for
moral wrongs wherever in the world they may be committed. Second, it thinks that it ought to be
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As Duff explains:
The wrong committed by one who criminally attacks a visitor or a guest is just the same wrong—
of murder, or rape, or assault—as it is if the victim is a citizen; what makes it the business of this
polity’s criminal law is that it committed with the polity’s territority—within its civic home. If we
invite or allow someone into our home, any wrongs committed against them while they are
there become our business: not because only then should we recognize them as wrongs (we do
not deny they are wrongs when they are committed elsewhere), but because only then are they
our business as hosts. The location of the wrong, as being committed within the polity, bears
not on its character are a wrong, but on whether the polity has the standing to define it as a
wrong that is ‘our’ business, and to call its perpetrator to public account. Its location is a
condition, rather than part of the object, of criminal liability. (123)

concerned with wrongs done to its citizens, wherever in the world the perpetrator, crime, or victim may
be. That is, before we get to pragmatic considerations or worries about how this might impact or
conflict with another jurisdiction’s sovereignty, Ferzania is in favor of extensive application of both
active and passive personality jurisdiction.
Active personality jurisdiction is an uncontroversial form of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
international law, wherein a state can exercise criminal jurisdiction over its citizens wherever they
commit an offense.11 Ferzania’s reasoning is as follows. It is wrong to rape and murder. Our citizens
should not rape and murder; therefore, our citizens should be called to account, as Ferzanians, wherever
they may have committed the offense.
Passive personality is a far more controversial form of extraterritorial jurisdiction.12 Still, the
Ferzanian polity wishes to exercise it as well. Here, the idea is that if a Ferzanian or a Ferzanian interest
is threatened anywhere in the world, and threatened by, recall, a moral wrong, then Ferzania will call
the perpetrator to account. And, Ferzania will add a dash of the protective principle, where it will
exercise jurisdiction over those acts that jeopardize its sovereignty or political independence – “For the
operation of the protective principle, actual harm need not have resulted from the acts. This
distinguishes it from the objective territorial principle (or effects doctrine).”13
Notice that Ferzania is a Duffian polity. Its citizens ask which moral wrongs are of concern to
them, and it answers that it is concerned with those wrongs that are committed by them and those
wrongs that are directed at them. But the sketch of the polity Duff imagines looks nothing like this—
gone is our civic home. To be sure, territory contingently matters—after all, most citizens will be within
their territorial home, committing offenses there, being wronged there, and so forth. But it is
contingent. Ferzania will call a Ferzanian to account if she murders anywhere. Ferzania will call a
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foreign rapist to account if the victim if a Ferzanian. Ferzania takes the reach of its realm to be able to
grasp any Ferzanian victims or perpetrators.
III.
A.

Evaluating Our Options
Active Personality

Ferzanian jurisdiction looks quite broad. At one point, Duff seems to reject this sort of exercise
of jurisdiction:
If I commit a theft in Chile while visiting there from Scotland, and return home, the Chilean
authorities might seek my extradition; if the conditions that our extradition statute specifies are
met, I am liable to be arrested by the Scottish police and extradited by order of a Scottish court.
I am not, however, liable to be tried for the theft in a Scottish court, or to be convicted and
sentenced under Scots criminal law: for what I did in Chile is not a crime under Scots law, even if
(leaving location aside) it fits Scots law’s definition of an offence. This is true even if it would be
feasible for a Scottish court to decide the case—for instance, if the victim and necessary
witnesses happened now to be in Scotland: the Scottish court has the authority over my
extradition, but not to try me. Now, on a Moorean account, or any account that takes the aim
of the criminal law to consist in serving impersonal values that generate agent-neutral reasons
for action, such jurisdictional arrangements as these simply reflect decisions about efficiency
and respect for state sovereignty....On the opposing view for which I will argue, the end cannot
be specified in such agent-neutral terms; it is that the wrongdoer be called to account by those
whose distinctive business his wrong is—by, that is, the Chilean polity. That is not an end that
Scottish criminal courts can hope to achieve; the best they can do is assist the Chilean courts to
achieve it by extraditing me. (97)
But this is rather perplexing. If the code tells us as citizens how we ought to behave, why
would it be inappropriate for Scotland to try Duff? It cannot be that the victim must also be Scottish.
After all, if Duff killed a Chilean in Scotland, then Duff would say that it is Scotland’s business. But it
isn’t clear why a public account of the sort that Duff imagines would yield that Duff’s killing of a Chilean
in Chile is not Scotland’s business. Duff is Scottish, and he violated Scotland’s criminal laws. (And, if
they don’t reach killing in Chile, the question is why not?)

Now, Duff recognizes the possibility of active personality jurisdiction (indeed, he believes his
theory explains it better than Moore’s account), but he does not advocate for it because he thinks they
“could amount to a kind of imperialism” (219, n.115) This is the “Ferzania is extremely nosy” objection.
No, Ferzania isn’t nosy. It is extremely normatively attractive. First, Duff’s civic home—“not
under my roof”—theory of jurisdiction is troubling. Remember we are talking about moral wrongs, and
then picking what is the polity’s business. So, the Duffian polity says:
Don’t rape and murder…here… Well, really don’t rape and murder anywhere because it is
morally wrong. But if you are a rapist or murderer then so long as it isn’t under our roof, we
don’t care. It is none of our business.
This is what the Duffian polity says to its own citizens. This is not about ignoring crimes committed by
other countries’ citizens in other countries. Rather, this is Duff’s view about the limits of a Duffian
polity’s concern.
To employ a distinction that Duff himself is fond of, we should distinguish between the
condition of liability and the object. The objects here are moral wrongs, so the condition that makes it
our business could be citizenship and not the commission of the offense within the territorial space of
the polity.
What, then, makes Ferzania imperialistic? It shouldn’t be the regulation of the citizen’s life
because, again, this is a moral wrong. Moreover, the Ferzania approach is better supported by the
analogy that Duff deploys. He mentions doctors with ethical codes. Now, to be sure, every hospital may
have its own rules of conduct, but it is the medical profession the regulates doctors. When the
profession decides the sorts of malpractice or conflicts of interests that justify losing one’s license, this is
about how the profession conceives of itself—it is not about how the profession limits its scope to only
those acts that occur within a particular hospital. Although there may ultimately be some territorial
limits, the conception of the profession is defined by its membership and not be where they might be
located.
Additionally, the victim of the medical malpractice need not be a doctor. The code speaks to its
members and tells its members how to behave first and foremost to non-members. Scotland can rightly
demand that Scots not steal from anyone, not just from other members of its citizenry or guests in its
home. It is just as wrong to take someone’s lunch money on the playground as it is to steal it from your
sister.
Indeed, with a view that governs citizens the way the medical profession governs doctors, Duff
has less need for his guest analogy. Once we decide the kinds of wrongs that our citizens ought not to

do to each other, do we really need to treat the others in our house as our guests? Or, instead, as we
decide what we ought not to do to each other, should we simply extend those decisions to what we
ought not to do to others outside our home, or to those who cannot be part of this bilateral discussion
(kids, cats, and trees aren’t citizens but are worthy of our moral regard)?
Indeed, the guest analogy’s focus on actual space only carries so far. There are certainly things
we ought not to do to guests, but guests are not fully bound by the rules of the house. To be sure, I get
to tell my son’s friend to get his dirty hands off my walls (even if he is allowed to destroy the walls with
smudged fingerprints at home), but in general, guests go home for the disciplining. If my son punches
the neighbor, I discipline my son whether the punch was in my home, on the street, or in my neighbor’s
home.
To illustrate, let’s assume I have a dinner party. In the middle of the party, I get annoyed with
my husband and throw a glass of red wine at him. This would be wrong. So, too, if one of my guests
were to throw such wine on me. But now imagine instead that my guest throws red wine on her
spouse, and that no wine gets anywhere other than on him. If it isn’t me and it isn’t my stuff, then my
guest might be rude, but it hardly seems like it is “my business” in quite the same way. (Notice the best
way to make this “my business” is to make the wine quite expensive such that wasting it does wrong
me.)
When the medical profession calls doctors to account, it does not matter what hospital they are
in. When my guest goes home and expresses his distress with his wife’s behavior this has nothing to do
with the fact that the insult occurred in my home, as opposed to theirs or a restaurant. The territorial
space is not the marker of the wrong, nor does it seem to be the right condition for the liability.
The territoriality principle seems supported only by a view that when deciding what is a public
wrong, committed by two members of the polity, that wrong is only of our concern if it occurs within
our house. This is a “not under my roof” theory of criminalization. While Duff believes that it is odd to
think that a United States court should care about a Canadian killing a Canadian in Canada, it seems odd
to think that the American polity would not care about an American killing an American two inches over
the US/Canadian border.14 It seems that the better explanatory account for the de facto limit of
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jurisdiction is sovereignty and not the publicness of the wrong, and I wonder whether Duffian polity
should find this normatively attractive.
To be sure, jurisdictional reach has been largely limited by the territorial principle. The
emphasis on territoriality has been linked to differences in evidentiary rules, geographic obstacles, and a
view that crimes were against the sovereign.15 But we are then dealing with a sovereignty limitation, or
contingencies of history, as opposed to a view that the exercise of active personality more broadly is
unjustified by a normatively attractive theory of criminalization and jurisdiction.
I suspect that any intuitive objections to active personality stem from the fact that we do not
have moral agreement about the underlying wrongfulness of the conduct. That is, the most salient
counterexamples are the American who travels to Canada to smoke marijuana, or perhaps a woman
who goes to another country for an abortion. But why should an American citizen be able to travel to
another country where it is legal for him to have sex with a ten-year-old? Or why should an American
citizen be allowed to travel somewhere so that he may have his daughter’s genitals mutiliated?
There are numerous, practical reasons why the world would not be structured to allow for
extensive assertions of active personality jurisdiction. We are limited by moral disagreement and
sovereignty concerns. But before we make our pragmatic concessions, the Ferzanian conception would
be a view that we are all accountable for all of our people who abide by our moral codes.
B. Passive Personality

Let’s turn to passive personality. I suspect that many people have the intuition that if a
Canadian bombs a school in the United States, then the United States should call the Canadian to
account. This only gets us the effects test for the territorial principle. But extended more broadly, we
could get to the idea of passive personality—that we have jurisdiction over harms to American interests
wherever in the world they may be, such that even if a Canadian kills an American in Canada, we can call
the Canadian to account.
This approach also has intuitive plausibility. If the neighbor hits my sister, I may wish to call him
to account even if he hits my sister in his house. His wrong is my business because my sister is my
15
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business. A polity should care about harms that happen to other members of the polity. Again, territory
seems to strike the wrong boundary.
But through this prism, we can question whether Duff has successfully defended his other flank,
against those who claim that he cannot account for non-citizens. From the perspective of passive
personality, we can see that Duff’s guest analogy has a weakness. To begin with, we can imagine that
our Canadian bomber is a trespasser, and not a guest. He comes in to blow up the school and then plans
to return to Canada. Is this really different from the Canadian who plans a bombing from Canada, or
who launches his rocket there? Does not Duff’s conception turn all unwanted guests, all interlopers,
burglars, and tresspassers, into enemies and terrorists?
A theory of criminalization that takes the polity first seems to make the Canadian’s crimes
parasitic on the polity’s structure in a way that seems to miss the import that the Canadian is
committing what is first and foremost a significant moral wrong. To be sure, Duff takes the object of
criminalization to be moral wrongfulness; the violation of the polity’s rules is a condition. But it still
casts those who are not citizens or guests as doing something altogether different than violating a
shared moral code.
Duff needs an account of how those who do not share our code (or are not citizens or even
guests in our home) can be called to account. And it seems strange to think that if a Canadian shoots an
American then the location along the border the Canadian is standing does important legitimizing work
in determining why we would want to call him to account, as though his status as our guest is somehow
binding him to us in a morally significant way.
It seems that a Duffian polity might make any moral wrong that impacts its citizens and its
broader interests its business. Our concerns, and our interests, extend beyond our borders. Our
territorial home does not seem to ideally limit the scope of our concern. And those who threaten our
fellow citizens can be called to account by us because they have harmed those we care about.
Again, there may be pragmatic reasons why states don’t exercise their jurisdiction
extraterritorially. First, there is a significant issue with notice. With expansive passive personality
jurisdiction, the laws to which one is subject would depend on who one’s victim was despite having no
notice of this fact. Now, in a world with more moral agreement both about what ought to be
criminalized and how those acts ought to be proportionately punished, this would be less problematic.
But clearly given the dramatic differences in the criminalization or punishment of different wrongs, this
creates the possibility of unfairness.

Moreover, the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction seems to indicate that the other polity
is not, cannot, or will not exercise jurisdiction. Thus, just as a Moorean polity may stay its hand for fear
of trampling on another state’s sovereignty, so, too, a Duffian polity might do the same.
But again, before we make pragmatic concessions, Ferzanians care about each other. And, thus,
they seek to exercise jurisdiction on all those who would harm their fellow citizens. These moral wrongs
are their business. But such a view, that creates cohesiveness by focusing on the shared fellowship of
victims does cast non-citizens who harm Ferzanians as the very interlopers Duff aims to avoid.
C. Active, Passive, or Both?
It is difficult in practice to sort out whether a polity ought to exercise active jurisdiction, passive
jurisdiction, or both. A Duffian ought to choose what matters, and ideally, we would have one universal
theory about each state’s jurisdiction. But we might ask one final question about overlapping
sovereignty. Double jeopardy-like concerns loom large as we worry whether both polities might
attempt to exercise jurisdiction.
In his discussion of doctors, Duff tells us that there are sometimes two wrongs that allow two
sovereigns to both punish. The doctor who uses his position to steal from his patient violates his code of
medical ethics and violates the criminal law. (88) Duff does complicate the picture a bit, considering
doctors who violate the criminal law by approving sex-selective abortions. (90) Duff approvingly
mentions a prosecutor’s decision not to go forward but rather to allow the Medical Practioners’ Tribunal
to proceed in the case. He further notes that this may be a matter of delegation: “sex-selective abortion
is still a matter of proper public concern, as a public wrong; but it is sometimes more efficiently dealt
with by the relevant professional body, which can now be seen to be acting on behalf of the polity, and
in effect at the request of the criminal law.” (90) Duff ultimately notes that there are interesting
questions of how to deal with overlap, that seem to be determined by what is “most salient” about the
wrongdoing. (90)
My goal here is not to explore the overlap between the medical profession and the criminal law,
but to note that this is a bit unsatisfying. Arguably, the reason to defer to the lesser remedy is because
the lesser punishment will be sufficient, but this is already to question whether we should conceptualize
this as two distinct wrongs. There seems to be a potential equivocation between the idea that the
public nature of public wrongs is a mere condition of liability, such that it is not what the wrongdoing
consists in, and the idea that there are two wrongs here owed to two different people. If eight-year-old
Katie bites the neighbor’s child, does she violate distinct wrongs—one to the neighbor and one to her

parents? Are they both entitled to punish her? Or are the wrongs largely the same one? Just because
an act can be of two polities’ concern, and one can be answerable to two polities, we should not assume
that both should punish. This then means that the “wrong,” in “public wrong,” may itself be a significant
limiting principle, as two polities should not exercise jurisdiction over the same wrong.
Ultimately, a Ferzanian polity would we need a deeper principle of how it constructs its criminal
law, or how likeminded polities might divvy up the wrongs for which we call people to account.16 I will
confess to finding both active and passive personality attractive, and I could see how a polity would care
both about the conduct of its members, wherever in the world they may be, and about its interests,
wherever in the world they may be found and whomever they may be threatened by.
IV.

Conclusion

Where does this leave us? Duff’s theory of criminalization does not definitively support the
same sort of territorial bounding that he believes it does. And non-citizens who commit offenses may
not be as easily assimilated into guests as Duff would have us think. Just as Moore’s account lets our
territory and sovereignty serve as a pragmatic, not intrinsic, limit; it seems, so too, must Duff.17 If our
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To be sure, Moore’s prima facie jurisdictional reach extends beyond Duff’s, even as I have expanded

its grasp:
Moore’s legal moralism ... is expansive as to its location and perpetrators, of the wrongs we
have reason to criminalize. If moral wrongdoing deserves punishment, it presumably deserves
punishment wherever, by whomever, against whomever it is committed. So we all have reason
to promise the imposition of such suffering on wrongdoers anywhere in the world, and thus
reason as legislators to bring all wrongdoers within the reach of the criminal law. Those reasons
are not restricted by geography or territory. The English legislature has reason to bring within
the scope of English criminal law not just wrongs committed within England, but those
committed anywhere in the world—to count as a crime under English law, triable in the English
courts and punishable in its penal system, murder, rape, theft committed anywhere in the
world, and indeed such wrongs as vandalizing property or drunken driving; to criminalize, and to

criminal law is a code for our citizens, it should follow them wherever in the world they may be. And,
alternatively, if our criminal code is about protecting our interests, it, too, should follow those interests
wherever in the world they may be. We then ought to prosecute the German citizen who kills the
American tourist in Germany.
The challenge that Duff set for Moore was to explain the territoriality principle. He asks, “What
normative sense can we make of the Territoriality Principle as the most common basic principle of ambit
and jurisdiction—and of these various qualifications and exceptions to it?” (106) He notes that “[a]n
obvious answer to this question appeals to pragmatic considerations and to a principle of state
sovereignty. On this view, normative theorizing about the criminal law must begin, not with the kinds of
local, geographically limited concern that the Territoriality Principle makes salient, but (like all
foundational theorizing) with certain universal and agent-neutral demands.” (106) He thinks this
account does not do justice to “the criminal law as a distinctive type of legal institution.” (108)
I have contended, however, that a Duffian polity in its most normatively attractive light would
shed the boundaries of territoriality and allow its realm to reach wrongdoing that occurs far beyond its
modest civic home. Territory, then, strikes me as a vestige of sovereignty and not constitutive of a
Duffian polity’s conception of what would be a public wrong. Although the civic home offers Duff a way
to cover non-citizens within a jurisdiction’s ambit, it is unlikely to be the most ideal way that a polity
could conceive of itself. Whether the polity is best served by thinking that its code should regulate what
its citizens do, or what happens to its citizens and interests, whether a code should or could include
both, or how we might begin to reconcile competing claims to jurisdiction I will leave for another day.

seek to punish criminal damage committed by a Turk on the streets of Istanbul. (74-75,
footnotes omitted).

